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This paper proposes a new electronic voting (e-voting) scheme that fulfills all the security requirements of e-voting i.e. privacy, 
accuracy, universal verifiability, fairness, receipt-freeness, incoercibility, dispute-freeness, robustness, practicality and scalability; 
usually some of which are found to be traded. When compared with other existing schemes, this scheme requires much more 
simple computations and weaker assumptions about trustworthiness of individual election authorities. The key mechanism is the 
one that uses confirmation numbers involved in individual votes to make votes verifiable while disabling all entities including 
voters themselves to know the linkages between voters and their votes. Many existing e-voting schemes extensively deploy 
zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) to achieve verifiability. However, ZKP is expensive and complicated. The confirmation numbers 
attain the verifiability requirement in a much more simple and intuitive way, then the scheme becomes scalable and practical. 
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1. Introduction 
Unlike paper-based systems, electronic voting (e-voting) 
systems based on computers, computer networks and 
cryptographic protocols enable efficient, accurate, secure, and 
convenient elections. Also resources of e-voting schemes are 
reusable, therefore e-voting based elections become inexpensive. 
Moreover, they do not require any geographical proximity of 
voters and they provide better scalability for large elections. 
Ideal e-voting schemes must satisfy privacy, accuracy, universal 
verifiability, fairness, receipt-freeness, incoercibility, dispute- 
freeness, robustness, scalability and practicality (1), (2), (9). However, 
there are tradeoffs among them and satisfying all requirements at 
the same time is really difficult. For examples, verifiability 
requires voters to be linked to their votes, and hence is in 
contradiction to privacy. Also, achieving incoercibility leads to 
sacrificing universal verifiability and hence accuracy (1), and 
satisfying dispute-freeness makes schemes complicated and 
consequently schemes become impractical or unscalable. 
Therefore many existing e-voting schemes can satisfy only part of 
the above requirements. 
To overcome these difficulties, this paper proposes a new 
e-voting scheme (18). The scheme satisfies all the security 
requirements of e-voting systems listed above. Also this scheme is 
based on weaker assumptions about trustworthiness of election 
authorities, i.e. nothing can make the scheme unreliable if at least 
one authority is honest among multiple authorities, and the way of 
candidate selections is flexible; it accepts freely chosen write-in 
ballots, votes for a pre-specified or t out of l choices as well as 
yes/no votes. 
2. Related Works  
Among various security requirements, receipt-freeness and 
incoercibility are especically difficult to satisfy although they are 
essential for voting, where receipt-freeness disables voters to 
prove their votes to any entity including themselves in order to 
achieve incoercibility. Several mixnet and homomorphic 
encryption based voting schemes (2), (3), (4) achieve receipt-freeness 
by attaching secret random numbers to votes while proving the 
correctness of votes by using interactive-zero-knowledge proof 
(IZKP) or non-interactive-ZKP (NIZKP). However ZKP that 
requires non negligable computations makes the schemes 
impractical. Also untappable channels, physically secure but 
unobservable communication channels, used in them make them 
unrealistic (3), (4). A worse thing is that these schemes cannot 
achieve the complete receipt-freeness. Namely, authorities can 
know the random numbers and use them to link voters to their 
votes. Although tamper-resistant randomizer (TRR) (2), a hardware 
device to generate random numbers for voters, achieves the 
complete anonymity of voters, TRR further worsens its 
practicality. 
About the incoercibility, in existing schemes (5), (6), (7), each voter 
constructs its encrypted vote while attaching the encrypted token 
assigned to it to submit its multiple votes without being traced by 
others. As a consequence, coercers cannot identify the exact vote 
of the voter. However, ZKP to confirm the equivalence of tokens 
corresponded to multiple votes of same voters sacrifices 
practicality and scalability. 
Although e-voting schemes based on the blind signature (12), (13) 
do not exploit ZKP, usually these schemes cannot satisfy universal 
verifiability nor receipt-freeness because voters’ blinding factors 
can be used as receipts of their votes, and therefore voters can  * Graduate School of Engineering, University of Fukui  
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prove their votes to buyers. Besides, these schemes assume the 
existence of anonymous channels which are impractical. 
Regarding paper based voting schemes, visual cryptography 
based schemes had been proposed (8), (9), (11). However, in these 
systems, voters must delegate their vote computations to the 
voting booth, therefore the voting booth can know the votes of the 
voters, by which the privacy of voters may be breached. Paper 
ballots prepared in advance do not guarantee privacy against the 
ballot creators either (9). Although solutions exist for these 
problems (9), they require NIZKP and assume the existence of 
recordable private channels which are impractical. 
3. Contributions of the Proposed Scheme 
To enable the proposed scheme to satisfy all the requirements, 3 
security components had been newly developed; they are 
confirmation numbers (CNs), signature pairs on encrypted votes, 
and those on blinded tokens. Here CNs are unique and registered 
numbers that are publicly disclosed in their encrypted forms, and 
they are assigned to individual voters to make votes verifiable. 
Because all CNs are publicly disclosed, anyone can convince itself 
that votes attached by CNs are the ones submitted in the 
authorized way. Also by examining the used CNs, anyone can 
confirm that all submitted votes are counted. A signature pair on v 
is a pair of signatures on v generated by different signing keys and 
ensures authenticity of even meaningless v when it has a 
consistent signature pair. Figure 1 shows the roles of voter Vj, its 
vote vj, and pairs of signatures on vj, confirmation number CCj and 
token Ttj assigned to Vj. 
 
Fig. 1 Roles of Vj, vj, pairs of signatures on vj, CCj and Ttj 
 
Firstly, Vj that anonymously obtained signed token Ttj generates 
its vote vj, secret random number rj and its encrypted form rj* to 
ask election authorities to repeatedly encrypt pair {vjrj, rj*} to {vjrj, 
rj*}*, and attaches xxj* and CCj*, encrypted unknown random 
number xxj and encrypted confirmation number CCj given by the 
authorities, to form encrypted triple {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*. Then, 
after Vj’s verification and approval of the correct encryption of 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj} in voting panel, authorities repeatedly sign on 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}* and decrypt it to 2 signed forms of {vjrjxxjCCj, 
rjxxj, CCj} while shuffling it with other votes, and finally disclose it 
in tallying panel. Therefore, Vj can conceal vj from others. Because 
rj is the secret of Vj, only Vj can extract vj from {vjrj, rj*}. 
Moreover, anyone including Vj and authorities cannot know the 
correspondence between Vj and publicly disclosed vj in tallying 
panel i.e. any single entity cannot decrypt {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}* 
without conspiring with all other authorities. Here in the vote 
approval process, Vj verifies whether CCj* is registered or not also 
while examining publicly disclosed encrypted CNs. 
In the above process, Vj can show its qualification for the 
election without disclosing its identity by the 1st signatures of 
authorities on Ttj, because forging the signatures on Ttj is 
impossible. Vj can approve its submitting vj also anonymously by 
the 2nd signatures on Ttj. Even after the 1st signatures are 
disclosed, the 2nd signatures cannot be generated illegitimately 
because different signing keys are used, therefore anyone can 
convince itself that {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}* approved by the 2nd 
signatures is legitimate, in other words, if illegitimate votes are 
detected, they had been generated after the approvals, or voters 
cannot complain even if their privacies are revealed in processes 
for finding liable entities for inconsistent votes. 
Here uniqueness of registered confirmation number CCj 
assigned to Vj and the signature pair on it enable any entity to 
verify the validity of finally disclosed {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}, i.e. 
when {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj} includes registered CCj and has the 
valid signatures of multiple authorities, anyone can convince itself 
that vj is the valid one. Because no one knows the signing keys of 
all authorities, the only ways to illegitimately generate a vote with 
consistent signatures are to copy it from other vote, or to disrupt a 
vote. However about the copying, both the original and the copy 
have the same CN, and this contradicts the uniqueness of CNs. 
Also anyone cannot disrupt signature pairs, so that both signatures 
reveal same values. Moreover CNs ensure that tallying panel 
includes only and all approved votes. Namely, firstly anyone can 
easily check that CCj* in the voting panel is the registered one, 
secondly, the signature pair on CCj disclosed in tallying panel 
ensures that CCj is the correct decryption of CNs disclosed in 
voting panel, and thirdly, the numbers of CNs disclosed in voting 
and tallying panels ensure that all CNs in voting panel are 
decrypted. Of course it is possible for authorities to encrypt CCj to 
CCj* dishonestly at the time when they generate CNs. However, 
dishonest encryptions are finally detected as duplicated CNs or 
disrupted CNs as mentioned before, and also liable authorities can 
be detected easily by forcing authorities to repeatedly encrypt 
inconsistent and unused CNs again. 
In the above, if Vj knows the decrypted values of rj or CCj, 
coercers can know Vj’s vote by asking them and finding the vote 
in tallying panel attached by rj or CCj. In order to protect voters 
from these threats, rj is multiplied by xxj, and xxj and CCj are 
repeatedly encrypted to xxj* and CCj*, so that no one including 
voters and authorities can know the corresponding xxj and CCj. 
 
3.1 Confirmation Numbers (CNs) 
 
 
Fig. 2 Encryption steps of confirmation numbers 
 
CNs attached to votes are encrypted repeatedly, so that no one 
can know their decrypted forms, and anyone including voters 
themselves cannot link voters to their votes attached by CNs. 
Firstly N unique numbers C1, C2, ---, CN (N is the number of 
voters) are generated as shown in Fig. 2 (a). Then P (at least 2) 
mutually independent authorities TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly 
perform encryptions and shuffles of all CNs by using their 
asks to encrypt
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encryption keys, i.e. TM1 encrypts CCj to CCj' to be placed in 
random positions as shown in Fig. 2 (b). Then TM2, TM3, --- 
execute the same operations repeatedly, i.e. CCj' is further 
converted to CCj'', CCj''', --- as shown in Fig. 2 (c) and (d). 
Therefore, no entity can identify the link between CCj and its 
encrypted form CCj* unless all TMs conspire i.e. no one including 
Vj itself can identify Vj from CCj.  
Here CCj' = E(K1, CCj), CCj'' = E(K2, CCj'), CCj''' = E(K3, CCj''), 
---, provided that x is encrypted to E(Ki, x) by the encryption key 
Ki of TMi. In the following repeatedly encrypted form CCj* is 
denoted as E(K*, CCj), i.e. E(K*, CCj) = E(KP, E(KP-1, --- E(K1, CCj) 
--- )). This multiple encryption is carried out based on the 
probabilistic and commutative re-encryption scheme described in 
Sec 3.4. 
3.2 Signature Pairs on Encrypted Votes 
To protect repeatedly encrypted vote {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}* from 
modifications during the process where it is decrypted to 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj} while being shuffled with other votes, 
multiple authorities TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly sign on {vjrjxxjCCj, 
rjxxj, CCj}* by their signing keys {M1, M2, ---, MP}. In the 
followings S(M*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*) = S(MP, S(MP-1, ---, S(M1, 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*) --- )) represents repeatedly signed form of 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*, where S(Mi, x) is the signature of TMi on x 
generated by its signing key Mi. Then, when encrypted signed 
form S(M*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*) is successfully decrypted to 
signed form S(M*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}), anyone can convince 
itself that TMs had honestly decrypted S(M*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, 
CCj}*). However, this scheme is effective only when all voters put 
meaningful votes. When decryption result is meaningless, entities 
cannot determine whether TMs are dishonest or {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, 
CCj} is meaningless from the beginning. A signature pair on 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}* solves this problem. When each TMi signs 
on {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}* by its 2 different signing keys M(1)i and 
M(2)i, it is impossible for any entity to consistently generate 2 
different signed forms S(M(1)*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}) = S(M(1)P, 
S(M(1)P-1, ---, S(M(1)1, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}) --- )) and S(M(2)*, 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}) = S(M(2)P, S(M(2)P-1, ---, S(M(2)1, {vjrjxxjCCj, 
rjxxj, CCj}) --- )) in unauthorized ways because each TMi knows 
only its signing keys. Namely, anyone can convince itself that TMs 
had decrypted S(M(1)*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*) to S(M(1)*, {vjrjxxjCCj, 
rjxxj, CCj}) honestly, when 2 forms S(M(1)*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}) 
and S(M(2)*, {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}) reveal same {vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, 
CCj}. These signatures are also generated based on the 
probabilistic and commutative re-encryption scheme. 
3.3 Signature Pairs on Blinded Tokens  
To show its eligibility anonymously, voter Vj encrypts its token 
Ttj to E(aj, Ttj) by using its secret key aj, and while confirming the 
identity of Vj by usual means e.g. through an ID and a password of 
Vj, authorities TM1, ---, TMP blindly sign on E(aj, Ttj) to generate 2 
different sets i.e. {S(X(1)1, E(aj, Ttj)), ---, S(X(1)P, E(aj, Ttj))} = 
S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)) and {S(X(2)1, E(aj, Ttj)), ---, S(X(2)P, E(aj, Ttj))} = 
S(X(2)*, E(aj, Ttj)) by using their signing keys {X(1)1, X(1)2, ---, X(1)P} 
and {X(2)1, X(2)2, ---, X(2)P}, and Vj decrypts them into 2 unblinded 
sets of signed tokens i.e. {S(X(1)1, Ttj), ---, S(X(1)P, Ttj)} = S(X(1)*, 
Ttj) and {S(X(2)1, Ttj), ---, S(X(2)P, Ttj)} = S(X(2)*, Ttj). Then, because 
TMs had signed without knowing Ttj, anyone except Vj cannot 
know Vj from S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj). 
3.4 Probabilistic and Commutative Re-encryptions  
A multiple encryption and signing scheme for votes and CNs 
described in Secs. 3.1 and 3.2 can be implemented based on the 
probabilistic and commutative encryption algorithm with 
homomorphic property, proposed in (15). In the election, different 
voters may choose the same candidates, therefore the encryption 
function must be probabilistic; if not probabilistic, same 
candidates are encrypted into same forms, and a voter can know 
votes of other voters who had chosen the same candidate even 
they are encrypted. Also to ensure the authenticity of votes, the 
encryption and signing algorithms must be commutative. When 
they are not commutative, the signed form of encrypted vote S(M*, 
{vjrjxxjCCj, rjxxj, CCj}*) cannot be decrypted to S(M*, {vjrjxxjCCj, 
rjxxj, CCj}). In Sec. 3.1 CNs are encrypted without being mixed 
with random numbers. Because all CNs are unique and all of their 
encrypted forms are different, probabilistic encryption is not 
necessary. 
To use re-encryption scheme proposed in (15), each authority 
TMi defines its encryption and decryption key pairs {Ki, Fi} and 
{Hi, Gi}, while selecting 2 large appropriate integers p1 and p2, 
where for any integer u and w, uKiFi (mod p1) = u (mod p1) and 
wHiGi (mod p2) = w (mod p2). Then TMi encrypts x to E({Ki, Hi}, 
{x, r}) = {E(Ki, xr) = (xr)Ki, E(Hi, r) = rHi} while mixing x with 
random secret number r as shown in Fig. 3 i.e. the encrypted form 
consists of a pair of data part E(Ki, xr) and a randomixation part 
E(Hi, r). Here, the key pairs are kept as TMi's secrets, in order to 
enable each TMi to securely use its key pairs under the 
environment where multiple authorities share the same modulo 
arithmetic. When key Ki is disclosed, it is easy for TMj to calculate 
TMi’s decryption key Fi from the relation KiFi (mod φ(p1)) = KjFj 
(mod φ(p1)) where φ(p1) = p1 – 1 when p1 is a prime number, for 
example. In the following uKi, wHi, uK1---KP and wH1---HP are denoted 
as E(Ki, u), E(Hi, w), E(K*, u) and E(H*, w) respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 3 E({Ki, Hi}, {x, r}) encrypted form of x 
 
Based on the above scheme voter Vj encrypts its vote vj to E({Ki, 
Hi}, {vj, rj}), while generating its secret random number rj and 
asking TM1, ---, TMP to encrypt vjrj and rjLj; where {Lj, Zj} is a 
secret encryption and decryption key pair of Vj, and TMs cannot 
calculate vj from vjrj and rjLj, because rj is secret of Vj and the 
calculation of rj from rjLj is a discrete logarithm problem. Then 
TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly encrypt the pair {vjrj, rjLj}, i.e. calculate 
E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj) by their encryption keys K1, ---, KP and 
H1, ---, HP, and finally Vj calculates E(H*, rjLj)Zj = E(H*, rj) to 
construct its repeatedly encrypted vote as E({K*, H*}, {vj, rj}) = 
{E(K*, vjrj), E(H*, rj)}. E({K*, H*}, {vj, rj}) can be decrypted into 
vj by calculating E(K*, vjrj)F1---FP = (vjrj)(K1---KP)(F1---FP) = vjrj and 
E(H*, rj)(G1---GP) = rj(H1---HP)(G1---GP) = rj by decryption keys F1, ---, 
FP and G1, ---, GP, and by dividing vjrj by rj. 
For the confirmation of correct encryptions of TMs, Vj asks TM1, 
---, TMP to decrypt E(K*, (vjrj)Aj) and E(H*, rjBj), where {Aj, Bj} are 
secret random numbers of Vj. Here, TM1, ---, TMP cannot decrypt 
E(K*, (vjrj)Aj) and E(H*, rjBj) into (vjrj)Aj and rjBj when they 
calculate E(K*, vjrj) and E(H*, rjLj) dishonestly, because they do 
not know Aj, Bj, vjrj or rj. Therefore although Ki and Hi of each 
TMi are secret, Vj can confirm the correctness of encryptions as 
same as it is using public keys. It is apparent that this encryption 
scheme is probabilistic and commutative. Fortunately, it is also 
homomorphic, e.g. E(K*, x1)E(K*, x2) = x1K1---KPx2K1---KP = E(K*, 
data part
E(Ki, xr) = (xr)Ki (mod p1)
randomization part
E(Hi, r) = rHi (mod p2)
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x1x2) and E(H*, y1)E(H*, y2) = y1H1---HPy2H1---HP = E(H*, y1y2). 
In the above, as Vj knows rj, coercers can use this rj to identify 
Vj's vote. To disable vote identification, Vj also multiplies its vote 
vj by random number xxj that is not known to anyone, where xxj = 
xxj1xxj2---xxjP. Namely, each TMi generates its secret random 
number xxji, and encrypts xxji by its encryption keys Ki and Hi i.e. 
calculates {E(Ki, xxji), E(Hi, xxji)} and asks other authorities to 
calculate {E(K*, xxji), E(H*, xxji)}. Then by using the homomorphic 
property, {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)} is generated by multiplying P 
different {E(K*, xxji), E(H*, xxji)}. Because each TMi knows only 
xxji, no one can know the decrypted form of {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}. 
For the confirmation of correct encryptions of xxj, Vj calculates 
{E(K*, xxji), E(H*, xxji)Bj} to ask TM1, ---, TMP to decrypt them i.e. 
to calculate E(K*, xxji)F1---FP = xxji and E(H*, xxji)BjG1---GP = xxjiBj, for 
randomly selected i, and Vj checks the consistency between xxji 
and xxjiBj. When E(K*, xxji) and E(H*, xxji) are calculated 
dishonestly, TM1, ---, TMP cannot decrypt E(K*, xxji) and E(H*, 
xxji)Bj into xxji and xxjiBj because they do not know Bj or xxji. 
Because (P-1) remaining xxjis are still unknown to anyone except 
TMi, no one can know the decrypted form of xxj unless all TMs 
conspire, and Vj can calculate E({K*, H*}, {vj, rjxxj}) = {E(K*, 
vjrjxxj), E(H*, rjxxj)} while making rjxxj unknown to anyone. Here, 
to maintain the equality of 2 forms of xxj, i.e. xxj (mod p1) and xxj 
(mod p2), each xxji must be defined so that xxj is less than p1 and p2. 
Repeatedly signing mechanisms on re-encrypted forms can be 
implemented in the same way. However, each TMi can calculate 
signing keys {M(1)k, M(2)k} of other TMk when its verification keys 
{U(1)k, U(2)k} are disclosed from the relation M(1)k = M(1)iU(1)i/U(1)k 
and M(2)k = M(2)iU(2)i/U(2)k. Therefore, verification keys must be 
disclosed only after all votes are decrypted. In the proposed 
scheme all votes are put in bulletin board (BB), where a BB is a 
public broadcast channel with memories, and information sent to a 
BB is readable by anyone and at anytime. Then, no one can forge 
signatures on votes in BB even the signing keys are revealed i.e. 
before the disclosure of verification keys, no one knows all 
signing keys; and after the disclosure of verification keys, votes 
are already decrypted and cannot be modified. Here, Vj can verify 
the correctness of signatures without knowing the verification 
keys in the same way as in the encryption processes. 
Probabilistic and commutative re-encryption schemes also can 
be constructed based on ElGamal or threshold ElGamal encryption. 
However, to identify dishonest authorities without disclosing 
privacies of voters, ElGamal based schemes require complicated 
ZKP processes. 
In the remainder, E({K*, H*}, {vj, rjxxj}) is denoted as E({K*, 
H*}, vj) to make notations comprehensive. 
4. Configuration of the Voting Scheme 
Entities involved in the scheme are N voters Vj (j = 1, ---, N), 
Voting manager VM, P (at least 2) mutually independent Tallying 
managers TMi (i = 1, ---, P), Disruption detection manager DM 
and 6 public BBs that maintain authorized communication 
transcripts i.e. VoterList, TokenList, ConfNoList, ActiveTokenList, 
VotingPanel and TallyingPanel. Figure 4 depicts the 
configurations of individual BBs. By putting relevant information 
on several BBs, interactions among the entities at every stage of 
the election become publicly verifiable. In the followings Vj is the 
j-th voter, vj is the vote of Vj, and CCj, Ttj and xxj are the CN, token 
and unknown random number assigned to Vj. IDj and P/Wj are the 
identifier and password of Vj. The roles of each entity and the BBs 
are as follows: 
Voter Vj: Each Vj generates its encrypted vote E({K*, H*}, 
vjCCj) while combining its vote vj with its assigned encrypted CCj 
i.e. E(K*, CCj), and puts and approves it in VotingPanel. It has its 
own identifier IDj and password P/Wj for proving its eligibility, 
and 2 secret encryption and decryption key pairs {aj, gj} and {Lj, 
Zj}. {aj, gj} is used to acquire 2 different forms of signatures of all 
TMs on its token Ttj blindly i.e. S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj), and 
key pair {Lj, Zj} is used to ask TMs to encrypt vote vj without 
disclosing vj itself. 
Voting manager VM: VM is responsible for authenticating 
voters, for assigning CNs to voters, and for putting encrypted 
votes of voters in VotingPanel. It also puts other data about voters 
and votes in VoterList, TokenList, ConfNoList and ActiveTokenList. 
VM can be constructed by multiple independent entities to 
distribute its responsibility if necessary. 
Tallying managers TMs: Mutually independent P (P ≥ 2) TMs 
sign on blinded tokens, perform encryptions and shuffles of CNs 
and votes, repeatedly sign on encrypted votes and encrypted CNs 
in VotingPanel, and perform decryptions and shuffles of votes in 
VotingPanel to compute the tally and to put results on 
TallyingPanel. For encryption and decryption of votes and CNs, 
each TMi has 2 encryption and decryption key pairs {Ki, Fi} and 
{Hi, Gi}. Also to sign on blinded token E(aj, Ttj), TMi has 2 signing 
and verification key pairs i.e. {X(1)i, B(1)i} and {X(2)i, B(2)i}, and to 
repeatedly sign on encrypted votes and encrypted CNs in 2 
different forms, it has 4 secret signing and verification key pairs 
{{M(1)i, U(1)i}, {Q(1)i, W(1)i}} and {{M(2)i, U(2)i}, {Q(2)i, W(2)i}}. 
Disruption detection manager DM: DM detects inconsistent 
votes in TallyingPanel, and when inconsistencies are detected it 
identifies the entities that cause the inconsistencies. 
 
Fig. 4 Configurations of bulletin boards. 
 
VoterList: VoterList consists of ID and token parts. ID part 
maintains IDs of eligible voters, and VM puts E(aj, Ttj), a token 
encrypted by voter Vj, at the token part corresponding to Vj’s ID 
when Vj shows it to obtain TMs’ signatures on it as shown in Fig. 4 
(a). Therefore anyone can know voters who had acquired 
signatures of TMs on their tokens. However no one except voters 
themselves can know tokens on which TMs had signed. 
TokenList: TokenList consists of the token and flag parts, and 
enables voters to acquire tokens without collision. The token part 
maintains tokens i.e. unique numbers prepared by VM. When Vj 
picks unused token Ttj from TokenList anonymously, VM makes 
the corresponding flag part used as shown in Fig. 4 (b). 
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ConfNoList: It consists of CN and random number parts, and 
for N voters, N different CNs and unknown random numbers are 
generated and each CN and random number pair {CCj, xxj} is 
encrypted to E(K*, CCj) and {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)} to be posted 
here at random by VM as shown in Fig. 4 (c). 
ActiveTokenList: It consists of the token and the CN parts, and 
enables anyone to know anonymous Vj who had been assigned CCj 
in its encrypted form. The tj-th position of the token part maintains 
the 1st signed form of the tj-th token Ttj i.e. S(X(1)*, Ttj). The 
corresponding CN part maintains encrypted CCj, CN assigned to 
the voter who obtains Ttj i.e. E(K*, CCj) as shown in Fig. 4 (d). 
Here, by comparing the items in ActiveTokenList, ConfNoList and 
VoterList, anyone can verify that only voters with their signed 
tokens acquire CNs, and VM is not misusing or adding any extra 
CN illegally. 
VotingPanel: VotingPanel consists of the vote and the approval 
parts, and enables anyone to know encrypted votes approved by 
their voters. The vote part corresponding to the tj-th position 
maintains 2 different signed forms of encrypted vote of the voter 
to whom the tj-th token Ttj is assigned. Namely it maintains 
anonymous Vj’s encrypted vote vj repeatedly signed by 2 secret 
signing key pairs {M(1)i, Q(1)i} and {M(2)i, Q(2)i} of all TMi and 
encrypted CCj in the 1st signed form i.e. S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, E({K*, 
H*}, vjCCj)), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) and S(M(1)*, E(K*, 
CCj)), and the approval part maintains the 2nd signed form of Ttj 
i.e. S(X(2)*, Ttj) as shown in Fig. 4 (e). In the above, S({M(h)*, Q(h)*}, 
E({K*, H*}, x)) represents pair {S(M(h)*, E(K*, xr)), S(Q(h)*, E(H*, 
r))} for h = 1 and 2, provided that r is a secret random number 
used for encrypting x to E({K*, H*}, x)). 
TallyingPanel: TallyingPanel consists of the vote part and the 
CN part and enables anyone to know the election results. It 
maintains decrypted data of VotingPanel i.e. the vote part 
maintains {S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vjCCj)} and the 
CN part maintains S(M(1)*, CCj) as shown in Fig. 4 (f). Based on 
CNs, anyone can verify that only and all votes from eligible voters 
are included in TallyingPanel. However, because votes on 
VotingPanel are decrypted while being shuffled to be put on 
TallyingPanel, no one can identify linkages between voters and 
their votes. 
4.1 Overview of the Scheme 
The proposed voting scheme consists of 5 stages as follows. 
The relationships and the data flows among the entities are shown 
in Fig. 5. 
Token acquisition: Anonymously authenticated voter Vj picks 
unique token Ttj while maintaining tokens collision free. 
Registration: Voter Vj whose eligibility is checked by its 
identifier IDj and password P/Wj obtains 2 kinds of blind 
signatures of Tallying managers on Ttj i.e. S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)) and 
S(X(2)*, E(aj, Ttj)). Therefore later on Vj can prove its eligibility by 
showing decrypted signatures S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj), without 
disclosing its identity. Here aj is a secret encryption key of Vj. 
Voting: This stage consists of 2 sub-stages. 
CN assignment: Vj proves its eligibility by showing S(X(1)*, Ttj) 
and obtains repeatedly encrypted confirmation number CCj i.e. 
E(K*, CCj) and encrypted unknown random number {E(K*, xxj), 
E(H*, xxj)} from Voting manager VM. Also, Vj verifies the 
correctness of encryption of {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}. 
Vote submission: Vj asks Tallying managers to repeatedly 
encrypt its vote vj to E({K*, H*}, vj) while randomizing it by secret 
numbers rj and xxj and verifies its correctness. Then Vj calculates 
{E({K*, H*}, vjCCj), E(K*, CCj)} while combining E({K*, H*}, vj) 
with its assigned E(K*, CCj) and submits it as its vote, and TM1, ---, 
TMP sign on them by the 1st form of their signatures i.e. calculate 
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) and S(M(1)*, E(K*, CCj)). After 
verifying its vote on VotingPanel, Vj approves the registration of 
its vote by S(X(2)*, Ttj), and finally TM1, ---, TMP sign on E({K*, 
H*}, vjCCj) by the 2nd form of their signatures i.e. calculate 
S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)). 
Tallying: Multiple decryptions and shuffles of votes in 
VotingPanel by Tallying managers compute the election results 
and they are disclosed on TallyingPanel while concealing links 
between votes in VotingPanel and TallyingPanel. However CNs 
attached to individual votes ensure that all and only eligible votes 
are counted. 
Disruption detection: If inconsistency is found for any 
disclosed vote, the responsible entity is identified while 
maintaining the privacy of voters. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Relationships and data flow among entities 
 
5. Individual Stages of the Scheme 
Individual stages of the scheme proceed as follows:  
5.1 Token Acquisition Stage 
An objective of this stage is to assign voter Vj a token Ttj which 
is unique in the system while maintaining anonymity of Vj. To 
achieve this objective, anonymously authenticated Vj picks Ttj 
from TokenList. Here, more than N different numbers are 
generated as tokens in advance and they are put in TokenList to be 
picked by voters; where N is the number of eligible voters. To 
enforce Vj to pick Ttj from TokenList, every Ttj has the signature of 
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VM (this signature is different from S(X(1)*, Ttj) and S(X(2)*, Ttj), 
and ensures that Ttj is picked from TokenList). However tokens in 
TokenList are open to the public only in non-signed forms to 
disable entities to pick them in unauthorized ways. Theoretically, 
Vj authentication is not necessary. But by protecting Ttj from being 
picked by unauthorized entities, it becomes possible to make 
TokenList as small as possible i.e. unauthorized entities cannot 
request tokens. Vj and VM interact as follows: 
1. VM authenticates eligible Vj anonymously e.g. through 
anonymous authentication mechanism (10). 
2. Authenticated Vj picks unused token Ttj from TokenList, and 
VM signs on Ttj (this signature is omitted in the following 
notations). 
3. In order to avoid collision, VM makes Ttj in TokenList used as 
shown in Fig. 4 (b). 
Security problems of this stage are solved as below: 
 Voters may get multiple tokens: Because only tokens with 
signatures of Tallying managers, which are given at the 
registration stage while confirming the eligibility of 
individual voters, are effective, voters can use only single 
tokens even they get multiple tokens. 
 Voters may not get tokens: As multiple tokens cause no 
inconvenience, Vj can request Ttj assignment repeatedly.  
5.2 Registration Stage 
Objectives of this stage are: (1) to let Tallying managers sign on 
token Ttj that is shown by eligible voter Vj without knowing Ttj 
itself (14), so that Vj can show its eligibility anonymously by it at 
the later stages, and (2) to let all entities know Vj who is assigned 
signed Ttj. To make voters that obtain signed tokens publicly 
visible, VM maintains VoterList, as shown in Fig. 4 (a), but at this 
stage Vj shows Ttj in its blinded form, i.e. VM puts E(aj, Ttj) in 
VoterList. Therefore anyone can monitor Vj who is registered, 
however, only Vj knows its token Ttj. As a consequence, Vj can 
abstain from vote submission without being noticed even it is 
registered in VoterList for example. The interactions between Vj 
and VM in this stage are as follows: 
1. Vj encrypts Ttj by using its secret encryption key aj i.e. Vj 
calculates E(aj, Ttj). 
2. Vj shows its IDj, P/Wj and its blinded token E(aj, Ttj) to VM. 
3. VM authenticates Vj and post E(aj, Ttj) in VoterList so that 
anyone can know that Vj has been registered. VM also sends E(aj, 
Ttj) to Tallying managers for their signatures. 
4. Mutually independent TM1, ---, TMP sign on E(aj, Ttj) with 
their 2 different signatures i.e. calculate S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)) and 
S(X(2)*, E(aj, Ttj)) and sends them to VM to be sent to Vj. 
5. Vj checks the validity of signatures on Ttj. 
Here the 3rd step ensures that ineligible voters cannot obtain 
signed tokens and even eligible voters cannot get multiple signed 
tokens. Also the 4th step ensures that anyone cannot forge signed 
tokens unless all TMs conspire. Security problems of this stage are 
as follows: 
 Multiple entities request signatures on Ttj picked by Vj: By 
this threat, Vj's vote will be rejected. There are 2 
possibilities, the 1st one occurs when signed Ttj is stolen, 
however Vj is responsible for that. The other possibility is 
a case where VM uses signed Ttj. This possibility can be 
excluded, if necessary, by duplicating VM, i.e. no entity 
can obtain signatures of all TMs on Ttj in unauthorized 
ways unless all VMs conspire. 
 Voters cannot get correct signed tokens: Vj can prove 
VM's dishonesty by showing E(aj, Ttj) and the incorrect 
signed token. 
5.3 Voting Stage 
This stage consists of 2 sub-stages, which are: i) CN assignment 
and ii) Vote submission. 
5.3.1 CN Assignment Sub-Stage 
In this sub-stage: (1) Voting manager VM authenticates voter Vj 
anonymously by signed token S(X(1)*, Ttj), and (2) Vj receives 
encrypted CCj i.e. E(K*, CCj) and encrypted unknown random 
number {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}. While VM sends E(K*, CCj) to Vj, it 
also discloses E(K*, CCj) and S(X(1)*, Ttj) in ActiveTokenList. Here 
as shown in Sec 3.1, anyone even Vj itself cannot identify the 
correspondence between original CCj and E(K*, CCj), and hence 
between CCj and Vj. However, because CNs are unique and 
registered, and no one can forge signatures of all Tallying 
managers on them, any entity can confirm the accuracy of votes 
by CNs disclosed in TallyingPanel. The interactions between Vj 
and VM in this sub-stage are as follows: 
1. Vj submits S(X(1)*, Ttj) to VM, and VM checks the validity of 
S(X(1)*, Ttj). Here VM can verify the authenticity of Vj by checking 
only the signatures on Ttj that is not used repeatedly. 
2. VM sends E(K*, CCj) and {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)} to Vj, and Vj 
verifies the correctness of encryption of {E(K*, xxj), E(H*, xxj)}.  
3. VM also puts S(X(1)*, Ttj) and E(K*, CCj) in ActiveTokenList as 
shown in Fig. 4 (d). 
Security problems of this sub-stage are as follows: 
 VM may put signed tokens in ActiveTokenList before 
voters: VM knows neither of Vj's secret key nor the 
signing keys of all TMs, therefore it cannot generate 
S(X(1)*, Ttj) from S(X(1)*, E(aj, Ttj)) or Ttj to put it before Vj. 
 VM may not put signed token in ActiveTokenList: VM 
cannot deny putting of S(X(1)*, Ttj) on ActiveTokenList 
because S(X(1)*, Ttj) has the signatures of all TMs. 
 VM may not give CCj, or give incorrect CCj to Vj: As 
S(X(1)*, Ttj) is open to the public, VM cannot deny giving 
of CCj. Also as E(K*, CCj) is open on ConfNoList, VM 
cannot give non-registered CCj. Although it is possible that 
TMs encrypt CCj incorrectly, this dishonesty and the 
responsible entities are detected at the disruption detection 
stage, therefore TMs cannot encrypt CNs incorrectly. 
5.3.2 Vote Submission Sub-stage  
In this sub-stage: (1) anonymous voter Vj submits its verifiable 
secret vote, (2) Tallying managers TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly sign 
on the vote, (3) after confirming the successful registration of the 
vote on VotingPanel, Vj approves its vote by putting the 2nd 
signed form of Ttj i.e. S(X(2)*, Ttj) in VotingPanel as shown in Fig. 
4 (e), and (4) finally TMs repeatedly sign on the vote by the 2nd 
form of their signatures. Here, E(K*, vjrjxxj) and E(H*, rjxxj) are 
computed as the product of E(K*, vjrj) and E(K*, xxj), and E(H*, rj) 
and E(H*, xxj) respectively, and vote E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) is 
constructed as the product of E(K*, vjrjxxj) and E(K*, CCj). As Vj 
asks TMs to encrypt vjrj instead of vj while generating secret 
random number rj, TM1, ---, TMP cannot know vj. Also encrypted 
vjrj is further multiplied by encrypted xxj, of which decrypted value 
is not known to anyone; therefore even Vj cannot identify its vote 
at the tallying stage. About the approval of votes, because no one 
except Vj knows S(X(2)*, Ttj) even after S(X(1)*, Ttj) had been 
disclosed, only Vj can approve its vote, consequently Vj cannot 
claim any dishonesty about its vote after its approval. Figure 6 
depicts the steps of vote constructions; they proceed as follows: 
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Fig. 6 Vote construction procedures 
 
1. Vj generates its secret random number rj to calculate vjrj and 
rjLj, and asks TM1, ---, TMP to encrypt them into E(K*, vjrj) and 
E(H*, rjLj). By using these results, Vj calculates E({K*, H*}, vj) = 
{E(K*, vjrj), E(H*, rj)} as described in Sec 3.4. 
2. Vj verifies the correctness of encryption of E({K*, H*}, vj), 
and calculates E(K*, vjrj)E(K*, xxj) = E(K*, vjrjxxj) and E(H*, 
rj)E(H*, xxj) = E(H*, rjxxj). Then it multiplies E(K*, vjrjxxj) by its 
E(K*, CCj), i.e. calculates E(K*, vjrjxxj)E(K*, CCj) = E(K*, vjCCjrjxxj), 
and constructs its vote as E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) = {E(K*, vjCCjrjxxj), 
E(H*, rjxxj)}. 
3. Vj submits E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) and E(K*, CCj) as its vote and 
puts them on the position corresponding to Ttj in VotingPanel. 
4. TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly sign on E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) and E(K*, 
CCj) in VotingPanel by the 1st form of their signatures i.e. 
calculate S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, E({K*, H*}, vjCCj)) and S(M(1)*, E(K*, 
CCj)). 
5. After confirming the correctness of signatures on its vote in 
VotingPanel, Vj submits S(X(2)*, Ttj) to VM as its approval. 
6. TM1, ---, TMP repeatedly sign on E({K*, H*}, vjCCj) by the 
2nd form of their signatures i.e. calculate S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, E({K*, 
H*}, vjCCj)). Finally Vj verifies the signatures. 
For this sub-stage security problems are as follows: 
 Voters may submit invalid votes to disrupt the voting: Vj 
cannot claim that its vote is disrupted even its vote is 
meaningless when disclosed CCj is valid and signatures i.e. 
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj) and S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vjCCj)} are 
consistent. 
 VM may not put vote or put incorrect vote on 
VotingPanel: As S(X(1)*, Ttj) is open to the public, Vj can 
repeatedly submit its vote before its approval, therefore 
VM cannot deny putting. If VM puts incorrect vote, Vj can 
disapprove it. 
 Someone may disrupt votes in VotingPanel: As 
VotingPanel is open to the public, no one can modify or 
delete votes without being detected. 
5.4 Tallying Stage  
Objectives of this stage are to decrypt all encrypted votes in 
VotingPanel and to disclose the results on TallyingPanel while 
concealing links between voters and their votes. When the 
deadline of vote submission comes, mutually independent TMs 
repeatedly perform decryptions and shuffles of votes by using 
their secret decryption keys to post the results on TallyingPanel, as 
shown in Fig. 7. In the figure, 3 Tallying managers TM2, TM1 and 
TM3 execute decryptions and shuffles. In this example, multiple 
decryptions are executed in the order different from encryptions. 
For this stage security problems are as follows: 
 Tallying managers may change votes: No one can 
generate 2 different forms of votes consistently unless all 
TMs conspire, and when votes are changed, responsible 
TMs are detected at the disruption detection stage based 
on this inconsistency. For example, although TMi can 
forge S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vkCCj) from S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj), 
S(M(1)*, CCj), S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vkCCk) and S(M(1)*, CCk), and 
replace S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vjCCj) by it based on the 
homomorphic property, TMi cannot forge S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, 
vkCCj) consistently because it does not know S(M(2)*, CCj). 
 TMs may add votes: Anyone can detect the added votes 
by duplicated or by non registered CNs. 
 TMs may delete votes: By this the numbers of votes on 
VotingPanel and TallyingPanel become different which is 
detectable by anyone. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Procedures in Tallying stage 
 
5.5 Disruption Detection Stage 
If any inconsistency is found in TallyingPanel, Disruption 
detection manager DM identifies liable entities. Figure 8 shows 
examples of consistent and inconsistent votes on TallyingPanel. 
The 1st vote (1st row) is consistent because 2 different forms of 
vote v2C18 are same and also C18 is registered. The 2nd vote (2nd 
row) is not consistent because the candidates within the 2 signed 
forms are different. The 3rd vote (3rd row) is inconsistent because 
C-10 is not registered. The 4th and 5th votes (4th and 5th rows) are 
also inconsistent because of duplicated CNs.  
DM identifies the liable entities as follows. When an 
inconsistent vote v is found, DM asks TMs to encrypt v again in 
the reverse order of the tallying stage, namely each TMi encrypts v 
and discloses the result with its input vote in the tallying stage that 
matches with v. When this matching chain fails, the dishonest TMi 
is found. Here TMi cannot encrypt votes dishonestly because 
anyone can check the correctness of its encryption in the same 
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way as in Sec. 3.4. Also when v had been submitted in the 
authorized way, dishonest managers are identified before the chain 
reaches VotingPanel. Therefore privacies of voters are maintained. 
 
 
Fig. 8 Possible vote disruptions 
 
6. Evaluation of the Scheme 
6.1 Security Analysis 
The proposed scheme satisfies the requirements of e-voting as 
follows. 
Privacy: Voters submit their votes anonymously while showing 
their tokens, therefore no one except voters themselves can know 
votes of individual voters. Anyone cannot know voters who did 
not submit their votes either. 
Accuracy and universal verifiability: For obtaining tokens the 
eligibility of voters are checked by their ID and P/W pairs, and no 
one can forge signatures on their tokens, therefore any 
unauthorized entity cannot put its vote. Also as voters put their 
votes in the positions of VotingPanel corresponded to their tokens, 
multiple voting is prevented. Moreover, uniqueness of registered 
CNs and signatures on them ensure that all and only votes 
approved by individual voters are counted. 
Fairness: No single entity can decrypt interim voting results 
because votes on VotingPanel are repeatedly encrypted by 
multiple Tallying managers. 
Receipt-freeness: Voters know only their tokens, encrypted 
votes and encrypted CNs, and all of them cannot be linked to their 
votes in TallyingPanel. Therefore the scheme is receipt-free.  
Incoercibility: When decrypted votes in 2 different signed 
forms are equivalent, no one can claim that votes are disrupted, 
therefore coercers cannot invalidate elections by claiming vote 
disruptions while forcing voters to submit disrupted votes. 
Receipt-freeness of the scheme disables coercers to identify voters 
who had put meaningless votes, therefore voters can abstain from 
elections without being noticed by coercers by casting 
meaningless votes. Also the uniqueness of signed tokens that 
enable voters to prove their eligibilities, disables coercers to 
submit votes on behalf of voters. 
Dispute-freeness: Publicly-verifiable data about interactions 
among entities on the BBs, signature pairs on votes and the 
disruption detection processes enable entities to resolve disputes. 
Robustness: Voters can disrupt only their votes by submitting 
invalid votes. Either VM or TMs cannot disrupt votes. Because the 
correctness of votes in VotingPanel is ensured by individual voters’ 
approvals, and inconsistent votes and the liable entities are 
identified at the disruption detection stage, inconsistencies can be 
recovered by simply decrypting inconsistent votes again. 
Scalability: CNs simplify the computations of individual 
entities e.g. voters, TMs etc. while maintaining the total accuracy 
and the incoercibility of the election as demonstrated in Sec 6.2. 
Practicality: The scheme is based on weaker assumptions 
about trustworthiness regarding entities i.e. nothing can make the 
scheme unreliable unless multiple entities conspire. The scheme 
does not assume any absolutely trustworthy authority. 
6.2 Performance Evaluation 
A prototype system of the proposed scheme consists of 3 
Tallying managers has been developed, and the computation times 
required for registration, voting and tallying are measured and the 
performances are compared with those of Scratch & Vote (S&V) 
(11) and Coercion-Resistant Voting (CRV) (16) which are available 
for comparisons. The environment consists of a 1.60 GHz CPU 
with 504 MBytes of RAM, and GMP (17) 1024 bit modulus running 
on Windows XP is used for encryptions. The time required for 
registering a voter is 0.0471 secs, for generating a vote is 0.308 
secs, and for tallying a vote is 0.171 secs. Regarding the tallying, 
1000 votes can be counted within 171 secs (i.e. 0.171 * 1,000 = 
171), and this shows that the scheme is scalable and practical 
enough. 
 
Table 1. Computation time required by the proposed scheme 
Registration (m. secs) Voting (m. secs) Tallying (m. secs) 
Blinding 0.3 Vj’s encryption 3.0 Decryption 133.0
Signing 45.0 TMs encryption 17.0 Verification 38.0 
Unblinding 1.8 Vj’s decryption  9.0  
 Verification 108.0 
Signing 135.0 
Verification 36.0 
Total 47.1 Total 308.0 Total  171.0
 
The registration of voter Vj is comprised of token Ttj blinding, 
signnature pair generations of 3 TMs i.e. generating 6 different 
signatures on blinded Ttj, and unblinding of 6 signed blinded Ttj. 
Here it is assumed that encrypted CNs and encrypted unknown 
random numbers are prepared in advance, therefore their 
computation time is not considered. The construction of vote vj is 
comprised of the encryption of vj by Vj itself, 3 TMs’ triple 
encryptions of vj, Vj’s decryption of it, Vj’s verification of TMs’ 
encryptions of vj and xxji, TMs’ repeatedly signing on encrypted 
vote and CN and Vj’s verification of both forms of TMs’ signatures. 
The time for tallying is comprised of decryptions and shuffles and 
verifications of 2 signed forms of votes and single signed form of 
CNs. Table 1 shows the computation time of each stage. 
 
Table 2. Computation time comparisons with other schemes 
 CPU Registration Voting Tallying 
Proposed scheme 1.6 GHz 0.0471 secs 0.308 secs 0.171 secs 
CRV 2.0 GHz - - 26 ~ 62 secs
S&V 2.8 GHz - 1 ~ 2 min - 
 
As Table 2 shows, compared with CRV that rely on ZKP, CNs 
of the proposed scheme substantially reduced the computation 
times i.e. the time required for the tallying is reduced at least more 
than 1/100 times. In the table all computation times of all schemes 
do not include the communication time. Here CRV adopts 
threshold (n, t) ElGamal as the base encryption algorithm while 
using 5 and 3 as n and t values, where n is the total number of 
authorities and t is the threshold. The tallying process of CRV is 
comprised of verification of votes by NIZKPs, shuffling of 
verified votes, elimination of duplicated votes, shuffling of votes 
with unique credentials, shuffling of encrypted credentials of 
“√” and “x” imply consistent and inconsistent votes, respectively
√S({M(1)*,Q(1)*}, v2C18), S({M(2)*,Q(2)*}, v2C18) 
S({M(1)*,Q(1)*},vhC-10),S({M(2)*,Q(2)*},vhC-10)
x
x
x
x
 S(M(1)*,C18)
S(M(1)*, C2)
S(M(1)*,C-10)
S(M(1)*,C25)
S(M(1)*,C25)S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vaC25), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vaC25)
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vbC2), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vaC2)
S({M(1)*, Q(1)*}, vbC25), S({M(2)*, Q(2)*}, vbC25)
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registered voters, collision detections of registered credentials, 
separations of votes with invalid credentials, decryptions and 
tallying. 
Among the above operations all shufflings are carried out by 
verifiable mixnets each consists of multiple Tallying managers. 
Although the computation volumes of individual encryptions/ 
decryptions and shuffles included in these mixnets are the same as 
those in the proposed scheme, i.e. they are propotional to key 
lengths, verifiable features of the mixnets supportrd by NIZKP 
make the whole computations complicated, when compared with 
the proposed scheme supported by CNs. Different from the 
proposed scheme, in which each TMi executes multiplications 
corresponding to 6 decryptions for each vote, CRV requires huge 
number of multiplications for each vote to verify the correct 
behaviors of mixnets, i.e. to conduct each NIZKP process reliably 
usually about 80 times of challenges and responses are necessary 
each of which requires the same numbers of multiplications as 
encryptions and decryptions do. Also, the computation time 
required for tallying in the proposed scheme is strictly 
proportional to N, the number of voters, on the other hand that in 
CRV is the order of N2 because it must eliminate duplicated votes, 
although it is suppressed to the linear order by using hashtables. 
Because voters carry out voting processes interactively, time 
required for voting is not so serious as tallying, therefore CRV did 
not mention the time of voting. Regarding the proposed scheme, 
0.308 secs can be considered practical and scalable enough also. 
Moreover, many processes can be carried out in parallel by 
multiple managers if required. S&V is a paper based 
cryptographic voting system that offers entirely paper- and 
pen-based ballot casting, therefore the voting procedure is 
comparatively time consuming. 
7. Conclusions 
The proposed e-voting scheme achieves verifiability while 
disabling all entities including voters themselves to know the links 
between voters and their votes. Namely, the scheme satisfies all 
the essential requirements of e-voting. Most importantly, while 
being supported by CNs, these are achieved in a simple and 
efficient way. Unlike complicated ZKP based systems, the 
simplified computational requirements of individual election 
entities make the scheme practical and scalable.  
(Manuscript received July 02, 2009, revised June 15, 2010) 
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